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CASE COMMENTS
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT PRECLUDE SUIT AGAINST ONE
STATE IN THE COURTS OF A SISTER STATE
NEvA4D4 v HALL, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)
In Nevada v. Hall' the United States Supreme Court further limited
the scope of the already waning doctrine of sovereign immunity in
holding that a state is not constitutionally immune from suit in the
courts of a sister state.
Respondents, California residents, brought suit in a California state
court for damages against the State of Nevada for injuries sustained in
an automobile accident. Respondents' vehicle collided on a California
highway with a vehicle owned by the University of Nevada and oper-
ated on official business.2 Nevada unsuccessfully appealed to the
United States Supreme Court from a decision of the California
Supreme Court holding it amenable to suit in the California courts.3
The trial court awarded respondents $1,500,000 in damages, the Cal-
ifornia Court of Appeals affirmed,4 and the California Supreme Court
denied review. Nevada again appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, which held: The eleventh amendment' to the United States
Constitution does not preclude suit against a state in the courts of an-
other state, nor does the full faith and credit clause6 require limitation
of any judgment rendered against the defendant-state to an amount
fixed by its statutes7 if the limit is incompatible with the forum state's
1. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
2. Id. at411-12.
3. Hall v. University of Nev., 8 Cal. 3d 522, 503 P.2d 1363, 105 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1972), cert
denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973).
4. Hall v. University of Nev., 74 Cal. App. 3d 280, 141 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1977).
5. The eleventh amendment states: "The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
6. The full faith and credit clause provides: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
7. Nevada's statute waiving immunity, at the time respondents' cause of action accrued,
limited recovery against the state to $25,000.
The state of Nevada hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby
consents to have its liability determined in accordance with the same rules of law as are
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public policy.8
The American doctrine of sovereign immunity originated in the Eng-
lish common-law theory9 that the King had absolute personal immu-
nity from suit in his courts by his subjects.'" In practice, however, the
King often "endorsed on petitions 'let justice be done', thus empower-
ing his courts to proceed.""
Shortly before the American Constitutional Convention, in Nathan v.
applied to civil actions against individuals and corporations, except as otherwise pro-
vided in NRS 41.032 to 41.038, inclusive, provided the claimant complies with the limi-
tations of NRS 41.032 to 41.036, inclusive, or the limitations of NRS 41.010, The State
of Nevada further waives the immunity from liability and action of all political subdivi-
sions of the state, and their liability shall be determined in the same manner, except as
otherwise provided in NRS 41.032 to 41.038, inclusive, provided the claimant complies
with the limitations of NRS 41.032 to 41.036, inclusive. An action may be brought under
this section against the State of Nevada, any agency of the state, or any political subdivi-
sion of the state. In an action against the state or any agency of the state, the State of
Nevada shall be named as defendant and the summons shall be served upon the secre-
tary of state.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.031 (1965) (amended 1975 & 1977).
Nevada's statute limiting liability, as it existed in 1968, provided: "No award for damages in an
action sounding in tort brought under NRS 41.031 may exceed the sum of $25,000 to or for the
benefit of any claimant. No such award may include any amount as exemplary or punitive dam-
ages or as interest prior to judgment." NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.035 (1965) (amended 1968, 1973 &
1977).
8. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424 (1979).
9. See generally United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 226 (1882) (Gray, J., dissenting); C.
JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 4-7 (1972); Jaffe, Suits4gainsl
Government and Officers.: Sovereign Immuniy, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963); Mathis, The Eleventh
Amendment: Adoption andInterpretation, 2 GA. L. REV. 207-10 (1968); Nagata, FederalPowerr and
the Eleventh Amendment:4ttorney's Fees in Private SuitsAgainst the State, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1167,
1173 (1975); Riple, State Sovereigntv,-- PolishedBut Sppery Crown, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 465
(1979); Shaw, Sovereign Immunity and the English Courts, 126 NEW L. J. 632 (1976); Comment,
The State as a Party Defendant: Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity in Tort in Mary/and, 36 MD. L.
REV. 653 (1977).
10. See Nagata, supra note 9, at 1173.
11. Jaffe, supra note 9, at 4. Legal redress against the Crown or its officers generally was
available through the remedies of petition of right, monstrans de droit, or traverse of office, Id. at
19 n.56. These remedies were not merely discretionary: "Mhe King, as the fountain of justice
and equity, could not refuse to redress wrongs when petitioned to do so by his subjects." Id. at 3
(quoting 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 8 (3d ed. 1944)). "The King can do
no wrong" actually meant that "The Kiiig must not, was not allowed, not entitled, to do
wrong.. . ..." Id. at 4 (quoting Ehrlich, No. XIL: Proceedings Against the Crown (1216-1377) at
42, in 6 OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY (Vinogradoffed. 1921)). See generally
1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 518 (2d ed. 1923); 3 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 462 (3d ed. 1922); R. WATKINS, THE STATE AS A PARTY
LITIGANT 7 (1927); Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1924); Holdsworth,
The History of RemedesAgainst the Crown, 38 L.Q. Rev. 141, 149-50 (1922).
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Virginia,12 the Virginia delegates to the Confederation Congress ap-
plied to the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania for relief from
the Philadelphia sheriff's attachment of personal property belonging to
Virginia. The Council held that Virginia was immune from suit in the
courts of sister states. 3 At the Constitutional Convention, delegates
expressed concern over the states' susceptibility to suits;'4 Hamilton,
Madison, and Marshall, for example, argued that the individual states,
as sovereign, were immune from suits of citizens of another state.' 5 Ar-
ticle three of the Constitution, however, extended the judicial power of
the United States to controversies "between a State and Citizens of an-
other State."' 6
Interpreting article three literally, the Supreme Court in Chisholm v.
Georgia7 held in favor of a South Carolina citizen seeking assumpsit
against Georgia for repayment of a debt incurred by Georgia during
the Revolutionary War.'" Within a year and one-half, however, pas-
sage of the eleventh amendment 19 prevented a citizen of one state or a
12. 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) 77 (1781).
13. See Martiniak, Hall v. Nevada: State Court Jurisdiction Over Sister States v. American
State Sovereign Immunity, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1144, 1152 (1975). This decision reflected principles
of international law as they existed at that time. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,
I 1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (American court refused to assert jurisdiction over French govern-
ment owned sailing vessel).
14. See Martiniak, supra note 13, at 1152-54.
15. Alexander Hamilton, in replying to the contention that a citizen of one state could sue
another state in a federal court, wrote:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent. This is the general sense, and the general practice of mankind; and
the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government
of every State in the Union.
A. HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Mentor ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). See
Martiniak, supra note 13, at 1144 n.l and accompanying text. James Madison argued: "[Federal]
jurisdiction in controversies between a state and citizens [of] another state is much objected, and
perhaps without reason. It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court." Quoted
in J. ELLIOTr, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTIONS OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (2d ed. 1881). See Martiniak, sufpra note 13, at 1144 n.2 and accom-
panying text.
"Jacobs discounts these statements as political concessions" to help gain support for adoption of
the Constitution. Martiniak, supra note 13, at 1153 n.47 (citing C. JACOBS, supra note 9, at 12).
16. Section 2, clause 1, states: "The judicial power shall extend to. . .controversies between
two or more states;--between a state and citizens of another state;-between Citizens of different
states;. . . and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I.
17. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
18. Id. at 449-50.
19. See note 5 supra. The swift passage of the eleventh amendment can be viewed as rein-
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foreign country from bringing suit in federal court against another
state. In Hans v. Louisiana, z0 moreover, the Court interpreted the elev-
enth amendment to preclude a citizen from suing his own state in fed-
eral court, even though the language of the amendment literally
prohibits only suits by citizens of one state against another state.2 ' The
courts have not held that the amendment bars suits in federal court
against a state by its sister states2 2 or the United States.23
In accordance with common-law tradition, the individual states have
asserted immunity from suit in their own state courts. 24 Recently, some
states have waived their sovereign immunity by statute25 and others
forcing the idea that the states had assumed all along that immunity from suit was implicit in the
Constitution. See Martiniak, supra note 13, at 1154. Other commentators disagree, pointing out
the pendency during that time of suits in federal court against several states for collection of war
debts. Thus, debt avoidance may have been the major factor motivating enactment of the elev-
enth amendment: "Under what must be considered the better view. . . the eleventh amendment
was a reaction to fears that suits by Tories to recover property taken by the colonies during the
Revolutionary War would force States to raise taxes to intolerable levels." Comment, A voiding the
Eleventh Amendment." A Survey ofEscape Devices, 1977 ARiz. ST. L.J. 625, 626. See J. ELLIOT,
supra note 15, at 479; M. IRISH & J. PROTHRO, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 114-15
(5th ed. 1971); C. JACOBS, supra note 9, at 57, 69-70; 1 S. MORISON & H. COMMANOER, THE
GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 336 (4th ed. 1952); C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 99 (1922). In fact, the Supreme Court held that the eleventh amend-
ment applied retroactively and dismissed suits pending against states, even though the suits had
been instituted prior to passage of the amendment. E.g., Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 378 (1798). The early American cases provided little justification for invoking the sovereign
immunity doctrine beyond protecting the public coffers from further drain. E.g., Commonwealth
v. Colquhouns, 12 Va. (2 Hen. & M.) 213 (1808); Black v. Rempublicam, 6 Pa. (I Yeates) 39
(1792); see W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 971 (4th ed. 1971); Kramer, The Governmental Tort Im.
munity Doctrine in the United States 1790-1955, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 795, 801.
20. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
21. Id. at 15. Subsequent cases have found that the eleventh amendment precludes other
types of suits not expressly covered by the language of the amendment. See, e.g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (foreign state may not bring suit against a state); Exparte New
York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (eleventh amendment precludes admiralty case against a state, even
though admiralty is not a "suit in law or equity"); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900) (federal
corporation may not bring suit against a state); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887) (aliens may not
bring suit against a state).
22. E.g., Nebraska v. Iowa, 409 U.S. 285 (1972); Illinois v. Michigan, 409 U.S. 36 (1972);
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923). But see Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S.
251, 258 n.12 (1972) (action by one state against another violates eleventh amendment if plaintiff-
state actually sues to recover damages to designated individuals).
23. E.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965); United States v. Nevada Tax
Comm'n, 439 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1971).
24. See generally Comment, supra note 19; Comment, supra note 9; 43 Mo. L. REv. 387
(1978); 57 OR. L. REV. 478 (1978).
25. The statutes range from complete waiver of immunity in the State of Washington, where
the state is liable to the same extent as if it were a private person or corporation, WASH. REV.
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have abrogated it judicially. 26 The California Supreme Court, in Mus-
kopf v. Corning Hospital District27 abolished the California sovereign
immunity doctrine, and Nevada waived immunity by statute but
placed a limit on its liability.28
CODE ANN. § 4.92.090 (1978), to the more limited approaches of Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-
30-1 to -10 (Supp. 1979), and California, CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (Deering 1973). Many
states have exceptions to liability similar to those in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a) (1976). Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (state may condition its consent to be
sued as it sees fit); 43 Mo. L. REv. 387, 388-90 (1978). See generally White, The State Immunity
Act 1978. 1979 J. Bus. L. 105; 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 487 (1979); 16 URB. L. ANN. 306 (1979).
26. See Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Muskopfv. Coming Hosp. Dist.,
55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 937
(1970); Nieting v. Blondell, 306 Minn. 122, 235 N.W.2d 597 (1975); Jones v. State Highway
Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); Willis v. Dep't of Conservation & Econ. Dev., 55
N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970); Kitto v. Minto Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974).
Since the decision in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812),
which upheld the theory of "absolute" sovereign immunity, the nations of the world have gradu-
ally abandoned that theory in favor of a "restrictive" theory of governmental immunity. See gen-
erally N. LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 306-458 (1973);
Note, Internation Law-Sovereign Immunit--The Last Straw in Judicial Abdication, 46 TUL. L.
REV 841 (1972). Belgium adopted the restrictive theory in 1903, see Soci6t6 Anonyme de
Chemms de Fer Li~geois Luxembourgeois v. The Netherlands, [1903] Pasicrisie I, 294, Switzer-
land in 1918, see Ministry of Fin. of Austria v. Dreyfus, [1918] Journal des Tribunaux 594, and
Italy in 1925, see Trade Delegation of the USSR v. Ditta Tesini e Malvezzi, [19251 Giur. Ital. I,
204. France, Greece, the German Federal Republic, the Netherlands, and Austria have applied
the restrictive theory for many years. See N. LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENEY, supra, at 317.
"Socialist" nations generally adhere to the absolute theory, probably to protect the conduct of
their trade abroad through state owned enterprises. Id. at 308.
Generally, the restrictive theory draws a distinction between public acts and private acts and
permits the nation to be sued as a result of the latter, acts "which might have been done just as
well by any individual." State of Rumania v. Trutta, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 629 (1932). See N.
LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENEY, supra, at 322. In Collision With Foreign Government Owned
Motor Car, 40 I.L.R. 73 (1970) (Austria, Supreme Court, 1961), the court permitted plaintiff, an
Austran citizen, to recover damages for injuries suffered in a collision with a United States gov-
ernment owned vehicle that was being used to carry mail to the United States embassy. In decid-
ing whether to grant a foreign state immunity the forum nation may consider whether the
defendant foreign nation would grant immunity in the same situation. Aldona S. v. United King-
dom. 90 Journal du Droit Int'l 191 (1963) (Poland, Supreme Court, 1948).
Congress recently enacted a statute that embodies most of the principles of the restrictive immu-
nity theory and permits foreign nations to be sued in the United States' courts for certain activi-
ties. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611 (Supp. 1979).
27. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961). See 38 CAL. ST. B.J. 177 (1963).
See also Note, Overcoming Barriers in Calfornia Highway Litigation, 11 U.S.F. L. REv. 379
(1977).
The Muskopf rationale has been challenged but upheld in the California courts. See Ramos v.
County of Madera, 4 Cal. 3d 685, 484 P.2d 93, 94 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1971); Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.
2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968); Johnson v. City of Pacifica, 4 Cal. App. 3d 82, 84
Cal. Rptr. 246 (1970).
28. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.035-.039 (1977); see note 7 supra.
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Although never having before it the precise issue present in Ne'ada v.
Hall, the Supreme Court on several occasions has suggested that a state
is not amenable to suit in another state's courts.29 In Paulus v. South
Dakota3" the North Dakota Supreme Court held that South Dakota
was immune from suit in North Dakota's state courts.3' At that time
neither North Dakota nor South Dakota permitted itself to be sued in
its courts.
Even if a state that retains sovereign immunity can be sued by one of
its citizens in the courts of another state, the defendant-state may still
look to the full faith and credit clause for a potential defense. This
clause requires each state to recognize and give effect to the "public
Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State,"'32 which
presumably would include any limits that the defendant-state placed
29. See, e.g., Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944) ("A state's freedom from
litigation was established as a constitutional right through the Eleventh Amendment."); Cunning-
ham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883) ("It may be accepted as a point of
departure unquestioned, that neither a State nor the United States can be sued as defendant in any
court in this country without their consent. ... ); Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529
(1858) (It "is an established principle ofjurisprudence. . . that the sovereign cannot be sued in its
own courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission."). But see Langford v. United
States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879):
It is not easy to see how [the maxim "the King can do no wrong"] can have any place
in our system of government.
We do not understand that either in reference to the government of the United States,
or of the several States, or of any of their officers, the-English maxim has an existence in
this country.
Id.
At other times, dissenting justices have suggested that sovereign immunity should not be the
rule. See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com. Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949):
The Course of decisions concerning sovereign immunity is a good illustration of the
conflicting considerations that often struggle for mastery in the judicial process, at least
implicitly. In varying degrees, at different times, the momentum of the historic doctrine
is arrested or deflected by an unexpressed feeling that governmental immunity runs
counter to prevailing notions of reason and justice. Legal concepts are then found avail-
able to give effect to this feeling ....
Id. at 709 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare
v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973): "In a nation whose ultimate sover-
eign is the people and not government, a doctrine premised upon Kingship. . .is indefensible 'if
it represents. . . an unfortunate acquiescence of a political and legal order which no longer enlists
support .... ' Id. at 311 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting C. JAcoBs, spra note 9, at 160).
30. 52 N.D. 84, 201 N.W. 867 (1924). Plaintiff alieged that he was a citizen of South Dakota.
Subsequently, he amended his complaint to allege that he was a citizen of Poland and a resident
of North Dakota. The North Dakota Supreme Court nevertheless held that South Dakota was
immune from suit. Paulus v. South Dakota, 58 N.D. 643, 227 N.W. 52 (1929).
31. 52 N.D. at 90, 201 N.W. at 869; 58 N.D. at 647, 227 N.W. at 54.
32. See note 6 supra.
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on its tort liability. The Supreme Court has acknowledged, however,
that the forum state need not accord full faith and credit in situations in
which application of the law of a sister state would frustrate the public
policy of the forum state.33
In Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission,3 4
the Court used a balancing approach to determine whether to grant full
faith and credit. Under this approach, a court weighs the relevant com-
peting interests of each state and gives effect to the law of the state
having the greater interests.35 In subsequent cases, however, the
Supreme Court's analyses and conclusions generally adhered to a "sub-
stantial interest" test 36 and infrequently used "balancing" language. 37
In Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,
for example, the Court applied the substantial interest test 38 to permit
California to apply its worker's compensation law to a Massachusetts
resident. The worker was employed by a Massachusetts company but
was injured while temporarily in California in the course of his work.
The Court found that California had a substantial interest in ensuring
that every worker within its borders was covered by its worker's com-
pensation law and that application of Massachusets law would have
been in conffict with California's compensation scheme.39
In Nevada v. Hall"° the Supreme Court held that Nevada could not
claim sovereign immunity as a shield from a suit by a California resi-
dent in the California courts,4' and that the full faith and credit clause
33. Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (per curiam); Clay v. Sun Ins.
Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Watson v. Employers
Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. Ass'n v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935). Compare Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943)
(Texas workmen compensation award held to bar recovery in Louisiana proceeding), with Carroll
v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955) (Missouri Workmen's Compensation statute held not to bar Arkan-
sas common-law remedy).
34. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
35. See Simson, State Autonomy in Choice of Law: A SuggestedApproach, 52 So. CAL. L.
REV. 61, 63 (1978). See generaly B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1963).
36. Simson, supra note 35, at 64; see B. CURRIE, supra note 35, at 193-94.
37. See, e.g., Watson v. Employees Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 73 (1954).
38. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
39. "Full Faith and Credit does not here enable one state to legislate for the other or to
project its laws across state lines so as to preclude the other from prescribing for itself the legal
consequences of acts within it." Id. at 504-05.
40. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
41. Id. at 421.
Number 2]
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did not require California's courts to limit the damage award against
Nevada in accordance with Nevada's statutory limit.42
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens began his analysis with an
exploration of the origins of the sovereign immunity doctrine. He con-
cluded that the early Americans had rejected the doctrine's underlying
fiction, that "the King could do no wrong, ' 43 but acknowledged that
many American cases recognize the idea of sovereign immunity from
suit in the state's own courts. 4 Justice Stevens argued that, in contrast
to immunity in the state's own courts, immunity in another sovereign's
courts could rest only on agreement, express or implied, between the
two sovereigns or a voluntary decision by one to respect the immunity
of the other.45
After analyzing the Constitution, Justice Stevens determined that
nothing in the express language of the Constitution or in contempora-
neous events and discussions precluded suit against one state in the
courts of another state.46 He considered inconclusive the adoption of
the eleventh amendment after Chisholm because the amendment con-
cerned only suits against a state in federal courts.47
Justice Stevens then determined that the full faith and credit clause
did not require California to apply Nevada's statutes on waiver of im-
munity and limit of liability because the result would be "obnoxious"
to the public policy of California in an area in which California has a
substantial interest.48
42. Id. at 425. For the text of Nevada's statute, see note 7 supra.
43. Id. at 415.
44. Id. at 416. Justice Stevens noted Chief Justice Jay's reasoning in Kawananakoa v.
Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907), to support the conclusion that "[no sovereign may be sued in
its own courts without its consent," but then observed that Jay's reasoning "affords no support for
a claim of immunity in another sovereign's courts." 440 U.S. at 416.
45. 440 U.S. at 416-17. In support of this argument, Justice Stevens referred to The Schooner
Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); see note 26 supra. Justice Stevens hypoth-
esized that had this case come before the California courts in 1812, California probably would
have granted Nevada immunity because, at that time, California also held itself immune. This
interpretation of The Schooner Exchange asserts that the opinion is grounded on principles of
comity and not on a theory of "absolute" sovereign immunity. See note 26 supra.
46. 440 U.S. at 421.
47. Id.
48. "In this case, California's interest is the. . . substantial one of providing 'full protection
to those who are injured on its highways through the negligence of both residents and nonresi-
dents."' Id. at 424.
The Court cited Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939),
and Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), as ample prece-
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Justice Stevens concluded the majority opinion with a list of various
constitutional provisions that limit a state's sovereignty49 to bolster his
argument that the states never were intended to be wholly independent
sovereigns.5 Stevens suggested, however, that states might be advised
to voluntarily grant immunity to each other or respect statutory liabil-
ity limits to maintain cordial interstate relations, even though the Con-
stitution does not compel such comity."
Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion,52 felt that the majority's
approach, although "plausible,"53 was much too broad 4.5  The Court's
holding would be disruptive to the federal system because its reasoning
warranted the conclusion that states were not to be treated "just as any
other litigant in the courts of a sister state. '5 5 Blackmun expressed par-
ticular concern over footnote twenty-four5 6 of the majority opinion, in
dent for denying full faith and credit to Nevada's statutes. See notes 33-39 and accompanying text
swpra.
In addition, the majority distinguished Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932),
because the application of Vermont law in that case did not frustrate any public policy of New
Hampshire. The action arose out of a contract made in Vermont between a Vermont based em-
ployer and a Vermont employee who died as a result of injuries he suffered while working in New
Hampshire. Administratrix-plaintiff, a New Hampshire resident, brought suit in New Hampshire
federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship with the employer-defendant, a Vermont
resident. Justice Stone believed that New Hampshire's choice of law rules, on the facts, dictated
the application of Vermont law and, therefore, full faith and credit was not necessarily implicated
in the decision. Id. at 163-65 (Stone, J., concurring).
49. Stevens specifically noted: (I) the states are not free to levy discriminating taxes on each
other's goods because of article I, § 8; (2) the states are not free to deny extradition of a fugitive
because of article IV, § 2; and (3) the privileges and immunities of citizens in each state are appli-
cable to citizens of other states. 440 U.S. at 424.
50. Id. at 425.
51. Id. at 426. The Supreme Court defined comity in an early case:
"Comity" in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand,
nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. It is rather the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of an-
other nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (denying conclusive effect to French judgment in
light of French courts' treatment of American judgments).
This definition of comity expresses the notion that a balancing-of-interests analysis is appropri-
ate when considering whether to extend comity. For analogy to the full faith and credit determi-
nation, see notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
52. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice Blackmun's dissent. "440
U.S. at 427 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
53. Id.
54. The "Court paints with a very broad brush." Id.
55. Id.
56. Footnote 24 to the Court's opinion stated:
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which Justice Stevens discounted the idea that the majority holding
poses a threat to federalism. Interpreting the footnote as a weak at-
tempt to limit the scope of the Court's holding to traffic accident torts
committed outside the borders of the defendant-state, he argued that
reliance on this limiting fact pattern played "absolutely no part in the
reasoning by which the Court reaches its conclusion. '57
Justice Blackmun also asserted that sovereign immunity, at the time
of the Constitution's adoption, was an established and accepted fact,
and contended that the Chisholm decision and the eleventh amend-
ment's subsequent prompt passage were evidence of the implicit and
obvious understanding that the states retained sovereign immunity.58
Furthermore, Blackmun maintained that the Court could infer the
states' sovereign immunity from the constitutional "guaranty that is im-
plied as an essential component of federalism,"59 using the same ana-
lytical method it used in its freedom-of-association 60 and interstate
travel61 decisions.62
Justice Rehnquist, in a separate dissenting opinion,63argued that sov-
ereign immunity not only is an "assumption" the courts have embraced
for 200 years, but also has support in "the logic of the constitutional
plan itself. 6" Rehnquist then focused on Hans v. Louisiana65 and
California's exercise of jurisdiction in this case poses no substantial threat to our consti-
tutional system of cooperative federalism. Suits involving traffic accidents occurring
outside Nevada could hardly interfere with Nevada's capability to fulfill its own sover-
eign responsibilities. We have no occasion, in this case, to consider whether different
state policies, either of California or of Nevada, might require a different analysis or a
different result.
Id. at 424 n.24.
57. Id. at 429.
58. Id. at 431-32. Justice Blackmun considered Paulus v. South Dakota, 58 N.D. 643, 227
N.W. 52 (1929), to be the only case directly on point. In Paulus the North Dakota Supreme Court
held that South Dakota was immune from suit in North Dakota's state courts; at that time, neither
North Dakota nor South Dakota permitted itself to be sued in its own courts. Id. at 647-48, 227
N.W. at 54. Justice Blackmun interpreted this case as being contrary to the majority's holding.
59. Id. at 430.
60. See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
430-31 (1963).
61. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966).
62. 440 U.S. at 430.
63. Id. at 432 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger joined in Justice Rehnquist's
dissent.
64. Id. at 433. Justice Rehnquist viewed Nathan v. Virginia, I U.S. (I Dall.) 77 (1781), see
notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text, and the writings of Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton,
see note 16 supra, as supporting the notion that sovereign immunity was commonly understood to
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Monaco v. Mississppz 66and concluded that both cases construed the
eleventh amendment to preclude more types of suits than its literal
terms appear to describe. 67 He argued that a similarly liberal interpre-
tation of the amendment should prevail to preclude suits against a state
in another state's courts even though the amendment's wording does
not expressly cover that situation.68
Justice Rehnquist reinforced Justice Blackmun's analogy to the
Court's method of finding an implicit right to travel69 and shared
Blackmun's doubt about footnote twenty-four" of the majority opin-
ion. In addition, Justice Rehnquist expressed concern over suits of this
type because of the possibility of bias by the forum state against the
defendant-state. 71 Finally, he discussed the practical difficulties of im-
plementing the majority's decision, particularly the problems involved
in enforcement and collection of judgments in the defendant-state's
be implicit in the constitutional plan. Justice Rehnquist cited a number of cases that spoke in
broad language and purport to hold a state immune from suits in another state's courts. He con-
ceded the statements to be dicta, but offered them as supporting the notion that sovereign immu-
nity was the assumed and generally accepted rule. 440 U.S. at 436, 439. Cases cited by Justice
Rehnquist include Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961); Great N. Ins. Co.
v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446 (1883); Beers
v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527 (1858). See note 29 supra.
65. 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (eleventh amendment prohibits individual from suing his own state in
federal court).
66. 292 U.S. 313 (1934). In holding that the eleventh amendment prevents a foreign country
from suing a state in federal court, the Monaco Court explained its rationale: "States of the
Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent,
save where there has been a 'surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention." Id. at
321.
67. For the text of the eleventh amendment, see note 5 supra.
68. Other cases have expanded the eleventh amendment beyond its literal terms. See Ex
parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (admiralty case against a state precluded by eleventh
amendment even though amendment speaks only of suits "in law or equity"); Smith v. Reeves,
178 U.S. 436 (1900) (eleventh amendment precludes suit against a state by a federal corporation);
In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887) (eleventh amendment precludes suit by aliens against a state).
In determining whether the states yielded a portion of their sovereign immunity when they
ratified the commerce clause, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, as part of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has reached inconsistent results. Compare Parden v. Terminal R.R., 377 U.S. 184
(1964) (state submits itself to suit under Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60,
when it operates railroad in interstate commerce), with Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (employee may not sue a
state under Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219).
69. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
70. 440 U.S. at 424 n.24; see note supra.
71. 440 U.S. at 439.
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own courts.72
The Supreme Court's decision to reject Nevada's claim of sovereign
immunity in this case is analogous to the King stamping "let justice be
done" on a petition of right against the Crown.73 Although the inten-
tions of the Constitution's framers may be debatable, the Court's con-
clusion that state immunity from suit in another state's courts is only a
matter of comity certainly is defensible and leads to a just result in
Nevada v. Hall.
The Nathan v. Virginia74 decision can be analyzed as based on com-
ity rather than absolute state sovereignty.75 International law in the
eighteenth century generally recognized that a nation was not amena-
ble to suit by a foreign nation or foreign individuals.7 6 This principle
derives from the refusal of most nations at that time to permit their
own citizens to sue them.77 Reciprocal treatment between nations was
a logical extension: one sovereign would grant other sovereigns immu-
nity from suit in its courts and expect that favor in return. This reci-
procity was not recognition of absolute immunity, but instead a display
of comity-the willingness to grant a privilege not as a matter of right,
but out of deference and good will, with due regard to the rights of its
citizens.78 One reasonably can argue, therefore, that this comitous
treatment of sovereign immunity in the eighteenth century was a prin-
ciple incorporated into the "constitutional plan" of the United States.
Many nations have since shed their immunity and now allow their
citizens to bring suit against their government. International law has
evolved concurrently and now generally permits, on comity principles,
suits between nations and by a foreign citizen against a nation.79 Nu-
72. Id. at 443.
73. See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
74. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 77 (1781). See notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text.
75. But see Martiniak, supra note 13, at 1152-54 (Nathan assumes that a state is absolutely
immune from suit without its consent).
76. Id. at 1154; see note 26 supra and accompanying text.
77. See Martiniak, supra note 13, at 1154-57.
78. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895), defined and illustrated comity in this man-
ner. See note 51 supra and accompanying text. For similar definitions of comity, see Brown v.
Babbit Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 (1977); Nowell v. Nowell, 408 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966).
79. Eg., The Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211, 212 (W.D. Wash. 1946) ("In the absence of
statute or treaty, no sound principal of law or of international comity requires that the courts of
this country treat a foreign government more favorably as to sovereign immunity than our own
government is treated by the courts."). See note 26 supra.
[Vol. 58:481
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss2/9
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
merous American states also have waived their immunity from various
types of suits,80 and, analogous to the developments in international
affairs, comity principles provide little incentive to grant other states
immunity in their courts from such suits.
Justice Blackmun's appraisal of Paulus v. South Dakota8 overstates
its holding. Paulus simply may demonstrate comity: North Dakota
claimed immunity from suit by its own citizens and chose to extend the
same protection to other states.82 If a North Dakota resident could not
sue other states in North Dakota courts, other states might extend the
same protection to North Dakota in their courts.
In addition, the dissenters' analogies to the implied rights in the free-
dom-of-association and right-to-travel 83 cases are unconvincing. To in-
fer a constitutional right to individual freedoms is reasonable in light of
the high value Americans historically have placed on personal rights.
To use a similar analysis, however, to infer that the Constitution gives a
state the "right" to avoid tort liability is much less compatible with
traditional notions of justice.84
Because the cases the dissenters cite in regard to the eleventh amend-
ment all deal with suits in federal court, they have been explained as
reflecting the desire to avoid expansion of federal power.85 The
passages cited in support of the proposition that states are immune
from suit in another state's courts may be discounted as dictum.
One problem with the decision may be that because specific facts
play an important role in determining whether full faith and credit ap-
plies,86 it may be difficult at times to determine which state possesses
80, See notes 24-28 supra and accompanying text.
81. 58 N.D. 643, 227 N.W. 52 (1929); 52 N.D. 84, 201 N.W. 867 (1924). See note 67 supra
and accompanying text.
82. "[In the absence of allegations as to the law of the sister state showing a consent to be
sued, the courts of this state must necessarily regard a sovereign sister state as immune to the same
extent that this state would be immune . 58 N.D. 643, 647, 227 N.W. 52, 54 (1929).
83. See notes 60-61 supra.
84. The California Supreme Court stated: "[I]n a society such as ours, which places such
great value on the dignity of the individual and views the government as an instrument to secure
individual rights, the doctrine of sovereign immunity must be deemed suspect." Hall v. Nevada, 8
Cal. 3d 522, 526, 503 P.2d 1363, 1366, 105 Cal. Rptr. 355, 358 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820
(1973).
85. Martiniak, supra note 13, at 1154.
86. It should not have been surprising, however, that the Court found a substantial interest in
traffic tort liability. California's long-arm statute, under which it obtained jurisdiction, provides:
The acceptance by a nonresident of the rights and privileges conferred upon him by this
code or any operation by himself or agent of a motor vehicle anywhere within this state,
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the substantial interest.8 7 In addition, the defendant-state Nevada can
argue that it has a substantial interest in protecting its funds, and,
therefore, should not be required to give full faith and credit to the
forum state's judgment.81 Under the balancing of interests approach, 9
however, the Supreme Court could determine that the forum state's
substantial interest outweighs those interests of the defendant-state and
order the courts of the defendant-state to enforce the judgment.
Finally, the minority's concern about bias and lack of a neutral fo-
or in the event the nonresident is the owner of a motor vehicle then by the operation of
the vehicle anywhere within this state by any person with his express or implied permis-
sion, is equivalent to an appointment by the nonresident of the director or his successor
in office to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful
processes in any action or proceeding against the nonresident operator or nonresident
owner growing out of any accident or collision resulting from the operation of any motor
vehicle anywhere within this state by himself or agent, which appointment shall be irrev-
ocable and binding upon his executor or administrator.
CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17451 (1971).
The Supreme Court upheld a similar nonresident motorist statute on the ground that the state
possessed a substantial interest in traffic safety on its highways. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352
(1927). Similarly, the Nevada Supreme Court has upheld its nonresident motorist statute. Kroll
v. Nevada Indus. Corp., 65 Nev. 174, 191 P.2d 889 (1948).
Justice Blackmun's concern with footnote 24 is unfounded and his assertion that the specific
facts of the case played "absolutely no part" in the Court's reasoning is manifestly false, The
substantial interest analysis took full consideration of those facts. The Court described Califor-
nia's substantial interest as "providing 'full protection to those who are injured on its highways
through the negligence of both residents and nonresidents.'" 440 U.S. at 424 (quoting Hall v.
Nevada, 8 Cal. 3d 522, 526, 503 P.2d 1363, 1366, 105 Cal. Rptr. 355, 358 (1972), cerl. denied, 414
U.S. 820 (1973)). Clearly, the substantial interest test enables the Court to exercise considerable
discretion in future cases on whether the particular facts warrant extending full faith and credit to
a statute limiting a defendant-state's liability.
87. Two recent California cases involving California's choice of law rules illustrate why Ne-
vada may be concerned about the reach of California law. The California Supreme Court, apply-
ing California's dramshop act, held defendant liable when a California resident driving on a
California highway was struck by another California resident who had been served alcohol, al-
though obviously intoxicated, on defendant's Nevada premises. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16
Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976). The court imposed
liability on the ground that Harrah's advertised in California, even though the Nevada Supreme
Court had ruled in Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969), that Nevada
tavern keepers were not subject to dramshop liability and the Nevada legislature had removed all
criminal penalities for serving intoxicated customers. In Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143,
545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976), the California Supreme Court held that California could
exercise jurisdiciton over an action arising out of a motor vehicle accident that had occurred in
Nevada, because defendant, a Nebraska resident, routinely engaged in interstate commerce in
California and "the accident happened not far from the California border, while defendant was
bound for this state." Id at 149, 545 P.2d at 267, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
88. 440 U.S. at 443 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. See, eg., Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Alaska Pack-
ers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935). See notes 33-38 szmra.
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rum 90 is plausible but not persuasive. 9 1 Excessive jury judgments may
be appealed, and it would be overly cynical to maintain that state
judges would not give fair consideration to a sister state's claims.92
The Court in Nevada v. Hall reached a just conclusion the signifi-
cance of which will increase as more states waive sovereign immu-
nity.93 Even when a forum state chooses waiver, comity still may give a
defendant-state extraterritorial immunity, and the full faith and credit
clause still may limit a defendant-state's liability, although there may
be some uncertainty over what specific factual situations warrant it. In
most situations, however, the decision may confine the scope of state
sovereign immunity to the state's own borders.94
90. 440 U.S. at 442.
91. States, for example, could obtain insurance coverage for their activities in neighboring
states that have waived sovereign immunity. See 4 CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION,
RECOMMENDATION RELATING TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 811 (1963); Note, State as a Party De-
fendant: Abrogation of Sovereign Immuni y in Maryland, 36 MD. L. REV. 653, 662 (1977); Note,
Economic Analysis of Sovereign Immunity in Tort, 50 So. CAL. L. REV. 515 (1977). This action
could easily prevent the need for a "balkanization" in state relationships as Rehnquist suggests.
See 440 U.S. at 443 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92. See Broussard v. Columbia Gulf Transmission, 398 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1968) (because of
modem modes of rapid transportation and communication, people are citizens of the nation and
not simply of one locale).
93. See notes 25-29 supra and accompanying text.
94. See 440 U.S. at 427 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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